Group Specific Public Goods, Orchestration of Interest Groups and Free Riding by Gil S. Epstein & Yosef Mealem
  1
Group Specific Public Goods, Orchestration of Interest Groups 
and Free Riding 
1 
 
    
Gil S. Epstein 




Yosef Mealem   





We consider a two group contest over a group specific public good where each 
member of a group has a different benefit from the good. Our model can be 
interpreted in two ways: Each of the players has a non-linear investment cost in the 
contest, or alternatively, the returns to effort are decreasing as reflected in the contest 
success function. In the first part of the paper we show conditions under which free-
riding decreases and consider the different properties of the equilibrium. In the second 
part of the paper we develop the properties of the optimal formation of the group and 




Keywords: Contests, rent seeking, public good, heterogeneity, free-riding, 
orchestration of interest groups.  
 
JEL Classification: D72, C72, H41. 
 
 
                                                  
1  Corresponding author: Department of Economics, Bar-Ilan University, Ramat-Gan 52900, Israel. 
Email: epsteig@mail.biu.ac.il.  
We thank Ira Gang for his helpful comments and suggestions. Financial support from the Adar 
Foundation of the Economics Department of Bar-Ilan University is gratefully acknowledged.  
 
   2
1. Introduction 
Frequently economic policy involves a struggle between two groups: one group that 
defends the status-quo and another group that challenges it by fighting for an 
alternative policy.  For example, a tax reform may involve a struggle between 
different industries. Existing pollution standards may be defended by the industry and 
challenged by an environmental interest group. A monopoly may face a customers' 
coalition fighting for appropriate regulations. Capital owners and a workers' union can 
be engaged in a contest that determines work place safety standards, and so on. The 
outcome of these contests depend on the stakes of the contestants and, in turn, on their 
exerted efforts. In many cases, these contests may involve group specific public-
goods.  
  The purpose of this paper is to examine the equilibrium efforts invested by the 
individual players in each group. We consider the case of two groups. Each member 
of the group derives  different benefits from his group winning the contest over the 
public policy/ public good. We analyze two alternative types of contests which have 
identical outcomes.  In the first, each of the players faces an increasing marginal cost 
when investing in the contest. The idea behind this assumption is that one tries to 
affect the policy outcome at a low cost, such as by writing an e-mail, signing a 
petition on the internet or sending a text message by phone. In the case where an 
individual would like to be more involved and invest more effort in the contest, the 
cost for each extra unit of investment will increase.  Under the second alternative, the 
marginal cost for all players within and between the groups equals unity; however 
effort faces decreasing returns to scale in the contest success function. Sending the 
first e-mail has a stronger effect than sending the second e-mail, signing the first 
petition has a stronger effect than the second petition etc.  Under this scenario, the 
effect each individual has in a group of size N by sending one e-mail will be stronger 
than the effect of only one individual in the group sending N e-mails. The probability 
of winning, therefore, depends not only on the total amount of resources invested in 
the contest but also on the number of individuals investing effort in the contest.  To 
simplify the mathematical description, we will focus on one scenario throughout the 
paper.  
  We start by deriving the Nash equilibrium of the contest, focusing the on 
effort invested by each individual, the probability of winning and the expected 
payoffs to the different individuals in the contest. Our first result is with regard to the   3
level of free-riding in the contest. We show that the level of free riding depends on the 
return to investment in the contest. After which we consider different equilibrium 
properties of the contest.    
In the second part of the paper we develop the properties of the optimal 
formation of the group - the orchestration of interest groups, and its affect on the 
equilibrium outcome. We consider the situation under which one group initiates a 
contest and can add different individuals and/or groups to the fight for the specific 
cause. The question we pose is what would be the optimal structure of the groups 
being added? There are many real life examples for such situations.  Let us consider 
the following four examples (in section 4 we will present an expanded example):   
1.  Between two cities, "A" and "B", a contracting firm wishes to build a new 
highway. Opposing the construction of the new highway are members of an 
environmental movement who whish to leave the land free of highways.   
There are many alternative routes for the highway. The land owners on the 
route that the highway will be constructed will benefit and the size of the net 
benefit is a direct function of the size of land they own. On each possible route 
there are different land owners who own different amounts of land. In one 
route there are only two land owners, each holding large parcels of land and 
under a second route there are 7 land owners, each holding smaller parcels of 
land. In terms of direct profits from constructing the highway, the construction 
firm is indifferent between the two possibilities. However, in one case there 
will be two land owners joining the contest for the approval of the highway 
while under the other optional route there would be 7 land owners each having 
a smaller stake in the contest joining the firm in the contest over building of 
the highway. Which option would the construction firm prefer? 
2.  The owners of the stores and businesses in a large shopping center wish to 
obtain a permit to build a large underground parking lot in order to increase 
accessibility to the shopping center. Environmental groups oppose the 
construction of the parking lot since they claim it will have a negative affect 
on the local springs. In order for the owners of the shopping center to apply for 
the permit to build the underground parking lot they have to state the firm or 
firms that will provide security, maintenance, cleaning, etc., after the parking 
lot will be completed.  The shopping center owners could decide to hire one 
specific firm that could supply all the different services, or they could   4
approach different firms, each providing some of the services. The firms that 
would provide the different services would benefit from the construction of 
the parking lot and would join the contest for receiving the permit. The 
members of the shopping center have to determine whether to hire the one 
comprehensive firm or the several independent firms.   
3.  Let us consider a variation on the second example. Assume that each of the 
services can only be provided by a different firm. In this case what would the 
owners of the stores and businesses in the shopping center prefer: 1. all the 
firms that providing the services would combine together with one 
representative determining the lobbying effort of the group or 2. all the firms 
join the contest separately each with its own representative? 
4.  Consider a municipality which is considering building a park in its 
jurisdiction.  Opposed to building the park is a group of home construction 
firms that want to build a new neighborhood on this land. The park would be 
limited for use to the population of municipality "A". Since the population of 
municipality "A" is smaller than the optimal capacity of the park, municipality 
"A" is considering joining forces with either a big municipality in the east, 
municipality "B" or two smaller municipalities in the west, "C" and "D". The 
total population of municipalities is such that the population of "A" and "B" 
just fit the restricted capacity and the same for "A" plus "C" and "D".   
Municipality "A" must determine with which of the other municipalities 
should it join forcers with, "B" or "C" and "D 
These examples show that the structure of the interest groups is an important 
influence on the winning probability and final outcome of the contest. 
 
Katz, Nitzan and Rosenberg (1990), Ursprung (1990), Baik (1993), Riaz, Jason and 
Stanley (1995), Baik, Kim and Na (2001), Konrad (2007, and references within), 
Esteban and Ray (2001) and Baik (2007) study contests with group-specific public-
good prizes. Among them, Esteban and Ray (2001) and Baik (2007) are the closest to 
our paper. Esteban and Ray (2001) consider a collective action that has three features: 
it is undertaken in order to counter similar action by competing groups, marginal 
individuals effort is increasingly costly, and collective prizes are permitted to have 
mixed public-private characteristics. All individuals in a group are assumed to have 
the same benefit from the pubic good, while from the private good is a given total   5
benefit for the group. Thus increasing the size of the group decreases the benefit to 
each of its members. Esteban and Ray (2001) show that there exist conditions under 
which increasing the size of the group will increase the probability of winning, even 
though the benefit per member has decreased. Our setting differs from theirs in the 
following way:  there is a public good and each player receives  a different benefit 
from it. The benefit for each player is independent of the size of the group. Baik 
(2007), on the other hand, presents a model in which n groups compete to win a 
group-specific public-good prize, the individual players choose their effort levels 
simultaneously and independently, and the probability of winning depends on the 
groups' effort levels. The main dissimilarities between our paper and Baik (2007) are: 
1. in this paper, the costs are non-linear (Baik (2007) assumes linear costs); 2. in Baik 
(2007) investment can be aggregated, in the present model we can only aggregate 
them after a using non-linear transformation. In terms of the e-mail example, under 
Baik (2007) one person sending ten e-mails is identical to ten different individuals 
sending one e-mail each. Our model assumes that the two cases are not equivalent. 
Moreover, while Baik (2007) shows that full free-riding will exist and only the player 
with the highest valuation in the contest will invest, we show that all players will 
invest and free-riding is decreased.  
In the next section we present the basic model and the equilibrium outcomes. 
In section 3 we present comparative-statics and in section 4 we present the 
orchestration of an interest group. 
 
2. The Model 
Consider a contest with two groups competing for a prize. As in Epstein and Nitzan 
(2004) suppose that a status-quo policy is challenged by one interest group and 
defended by the other. This policy can be the price of a regulated monopoly, the 
maximal degree of pollution the government allows or the existing tax structure. The 
defender of the status-quo policy (henceforth, the defending interest group) prefers the 
status-quo policy to any alternative policy. The challenger of the status-quo policy 
(the challenging group) prefers the alternative strategy.  For example, in the contest 
over monopoly regulation studied in Baik (1999), Ellingsen (1991), Epstein and 
Nitzan (2003, 2007) and Schmidt (1992), the monopoly firm defends the status-quo 
by lobbying for the profit-maximizing monopoly price (and against any price 
regulation), while consumers challenge the status-quo lobbying effort preferring a   6
competitive price.  In the challenging group there are N players and in the defending 
group there are M players.   
 In  the challenging group player i receives a benefit of  i n ( ) N i ,..., 1 =   from 
winning the contest and in the defending group player j receives a benefit of 
j m () M j ,..., 1 =  from winning the contest. Player i  ( ) N i ,..., 1 =  invests  i x  resources 
to change the status-quo and player j ( ) M j ,..., 1 =  from the defending group, invests 
j y  units in the contest.  
  We consider two alternative identical (mathematical) problems. In the first, the 
probability that the new policy will be accepted and the status-quo changed,  c Pr , is 
given by the generalized logit contest success function as:  
 

















  with  1 0 < <α . 
 
We restrict our analysis to the case for which  1 0 < <α .
2 
The expected payoff of each of the players in the challenging group will thus equal: 
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and for each of the players in the defending group:  
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2 For  1 = α , Baik (2007) applies.   7
In the second alternative, we aggregate the efforts of the contestants in a linear way 














1 Pr .  The expected payoff becomes:  
 























As we can see, the relationship between both alternatives is given by  i i X x =
α  and 
j j Y y =
α .  This second interpretation states investment has increasing marginal cost.  
Today with new technologies the easiest way to try and affect a policy decision is by 
sending an e-mail or signing a petition through the internet. If one wants to increase 
the investment beyond this, costs increase rapidly. To simplify our presentation, we 
portray the model using the first option presented above. Any interpretation regarding 
i x or j y  may be transformed to  α β
1
i i i X X x = =  and  α β
1
i i i Y Y y = = .  
The first order conditions for maximization is given by  
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 .   Solving the first order conditions, we 
obtain that the Nash equilibrium investment of the different players in the each group 
equals
3 :   
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N i ,..., 1 = ∀  and  M j ,..., 1 = . 
The equilibrium probability of the policy being accepted and the status-quo being 
changed equals: 
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3 The calculations of the equilibrium investments (equation 5) and the second order conditions of a 
unique equilibrium are presented in appendix A.    9
3. Comparative-statics 
3.1. Free-riding: It can easily be verified that the expected payoffs to the players in 
the different groups are positive and that each of the players invests a positive amount 
of effort in the contest. Therefore, we do not encounter a full free-rider problem.  
However, for   1 = α  () 1 = β , we would have found, as in Baik (2007), full free-riding 
under which only the player with the highest valuation invests. Now consider the 





















. This ratio will be positive for any two players. Thus each player will 
make a positive investment, while in the model presented by Baik (2007), only the 
player with the highest valuation will invest. Note that for any two players that satisfy  
l k n n >  it holds that   () 0 1
1
1




















































.   
 Thus  for l k n n >  the investment of player k  is higher than that of player l by 
more than the ratio of the stakes (this is true for every value of α   such that 






 increases and the free-riding phenomenon 
gets stronger. Free- riding is at its highest level at  1 = α   (for the case of  1 = α  see 
Baik, 2007).  
 
3.2. Winning probability: In the case where  ( ) ∞ → → β α 0 , namely the investment 
value of each of the players in the winning probability converges to zero (or in an 
alternative explanation the cost of investing effort increases rapidly), we obtain that 
the investment of all players converges to zero:  0 → i x  , 0 → j y  (1 → i X  , 1 → j Y ); 
however  1 →
α
i x  ,1 →
α
j y .  
This result can be explained as follows: the effect each player has on the 
winning probability, 
α
i x and 
α
j y , depends, on the one hand, on the investment of 
each player and, on the other hand, on increasing returns to scale. In equilibrium we   10
obtain that the dominating effect is the increasing returns to scale, even though the 
investment of each of the players is very small. Thus, for  () ∞ → → β α 0 , 
1 →
α
i x , 1 →
α






This result states that for a sufficiently small value of α  the probability of the 
new policy being adopted is "almost" independent of the value the different players 




3.3. A change in the stakes of the game: Now let us consider how a change in the 
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since  1 < α  then  () 1 2 < −α α  and 1
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 . Moreover, a change 
in  j m  will have an ambiguous effect on the investment of player i:  
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A and B are the sum of the transformations of the players' benefits (stakes) in each of 
the groups and thus represent their strength. The condition shows that if a player is in 
                                                  
4 When α  is not sufficiently small the probability depends on all the different variables of the players.    11
the stronger group then increasing the rival's valuation will increase its rival's 
investment in the contest. At the same time if the increase in the valuation is in the 
stronger group this will make this group even stronger and will force its rivals to 




4. Orchestration of an interest group 
In the following section we wish to consider the case of the orchestrating of an 
interest group. The idea behind our analysis is that there exists a leading interest 
group that wishes to increase its size by adding another group or groups.  In the 
introduction we described four examples.
7 
To clarify our point let us add one more example: consider a municipality that 
wishes to undertake sewage water purification project. All the citizens of the 
municipality will benefit from the purification. Let us consider two different 
scenarios: 1. In the first scenario, the municipality is the leading interest group. The 
task of water purification can be given to a few firms or done by one firm. Assume 
that the benefit from water quality and value is identical whether purification is 
carried out by one or more firms. Since each firm that will be chosen by the 
municipality will join the lobbying efforts for the approval of the project, the 
municipality must determine with how many firms it wants to lobby for approval of 
this project. 2. In the second scenario there is a firm that is lobbying to have this 
project approved. What would be optimal for the firm: that each of the citizens invests 
effort to get the project approved or should the citizens divide into groups, (for 
example by neighborhoods they live in), where each group has a representative that 
will be active in the representation of his (her) group (neighborhood) in the lobbying 
process? 
                                                  
5  It can be verified (see appendix B) that there exists a sufficiently small α  (a sufficiently large β ), 
such that increasing α  (β ) in the range ( ) α , 0   ( ) ( ) ∞ , β will increase the investments made by the 






6 This result has similarities to the one presented by Epstein and Nitzan (2007) under which they 
consider the case where a change in both the size of the prizes and in their distribution affect the 
investments of the contestants. 
7 An alternative way to look at this is question would be in what way would it be best to add the new 
individuals to the contest. Should each individual added separately or should they be added as groups 
with a representative that determines their investment. If the latter is the answer then the next question 
is: what would be the optimal size of the groups?   12
 To answer this question we develop our theoretical framework in two stages.  
In section 4.1 we start by considering the case where an interest group can add one of 
two different groups to compete for the provision of the public good. In one group 
there is one member and in the other there are two members. In section 4.2 we 
generalize our results by considering the case of a large number of individuals that 
wish to join the contest to fight for the cause presented by the challenging group. In 
this section we analyze what is the best form for individuals to join the challenging 
group (in groups, single hand, etc). 
 













affects the expected payoff of each of the players in each group (the 
change in A is a result of a change in the number of players and not as a result of a 
change in the stakes of the contest): 
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Notice that increasing the number of members increases the value of A. By (10), 
increasing A increases the expected payoff of the challenging group. 
 
4.1. Adding one group with one or two additional members 
4.1.1 Identical valuations 
The challenging group (the group of size N) is considering adding additional groups 
to its coalition. Assume that there are two possible groups it can add ( {} 2 , 1 = R ). In 
group 1, () R ∈ 1  there is one member and in group 2 ( ) R ∈ 2  there are two members.   13
The total value of the members in each group is  ) , ( 2 1 F F . Thus if we denote the 
stake/benefit of the player in the one player group by 
1
1 n   and the stakes of the two 




1 n n  we will obtain that 
1




1 2 n n F + = .  
If the challenging group adopts the two groups (which now will include 3 
members), then by (10) the increase in members will increase the total value of A and 
the expected payoff of the group. But what would happen if it can only adopt one of 
the groups as in the examples presented above? The challenging group has to 
determine which of the groups it should adopt. 
Let us start by assuming that both groups have the same total value: 
2 1 F F F = =  and later relax this assumption. What would the challenging group 
prefer, one player with a valuation of  F n =
1
1  or two players while one player would 
have a valuation of  F n 1
2
1 γ =  and the second a valuation of   ( )F n 1
2
2 1 γ − = ? 
As we have seen above, increasing A increases the payoff of the group. We are 
considering the optimal formation of the group which will maximize the valuation A. 
This enables us to compare different types of group structures.  If we increase the 
challenging group by 1 player or by 2 players such that the sum of the valuations of 
the players equals F, the new value of A becomes, in both cases:  
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Therefore,  1 2 =
<
> = = L L A A  if and only if   () 1 1 1 1 1 1
<
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γ γ . We may conclude that, 
1.  1 2 = = < L L A A  if and only if   1 5 . 0 < <α  ( ) 1 2 > > β  ; 
2.  1 2 = = = L L A A  if and only if  5 . 0 = α ( ) 2 = β ; 
3.  1 2 = = > L L A A  if and only if 5 . 0 0 < <α ( ) 2 > > ∞ β . 
 
In other words, for high (low) values of α ( ) β  it is preferable to have one player. If 
5 . 0 = α () 2 = β  then the group is indifferent and if α ( ) β  is sufficiently small (high) 
the group will prefer two players.   14
In order to understand these three situations let us look at two opposite effects 
increasing the number of players has on A (and thus on the benefits of each of the 
players in the challenging group): On the one hand by (5) the investments of each 
additional player,  i x , is affected with an increasing  i n ,  and on the other hand, it has a 
decreasing marginal effect on the probability of winning. Given that the two groups 
have the same valuation  2 1 F F =  then adding two players to the challenging group 
will give a smaller effect on A (compared to adding one player) via the stake effect, 
and will have a stronger effect on A via the probability effect. In the case where 
1 5 . 0 < <α  the "stake effect" is stronger and thus it is optimal to add only one player.  
For  5 . 0 = α  both effects are identical and cancel each other out. For  5 . 0 0 < <α  the 
second effect is dominating, thus it is optimal to add two players. 
 
4.1.2 Different valuations 
From the above analysis we can also derive conclusions with regard to the situation 
under which the valuations of the groups are not identical,  2 1 F F ≠ : 
 
4.  For  1 5 . 0 < <α ,  if  2 1 F F >  the challenging group will choose the group with one 
member and if  2 1 F F <  any of the two groups may be chosen. Namely it is not 
clear that the group with the two members will be chosen, even though it has more 
members and higher valuation.   
5.  For  5 . 0 = α  then the group with the higher valuation will be chosen. 
6.  For  5 . 0 0 < <α , if  2 1 F F <  the group with two players will be chosen and if 
2 1 F F >  any of the two groups may be chosen. 
 
4.2 The possibility of adding any number of players to the challenging group.  
4.2.1 Identical valuations 
Assume that there are r groups,  { } r R ,..., 2 , 1 = , and their objective is identical to that 
of the challenging group. In group 1 ( ) R ∈ 1  there is one member, in group 2 () R ∈ 2  
there are two members and so on till group r ( ) R r ∈  which has r members. The total 
value of the members in each group is  ) ,..., ( 1 r F F . If the challenging group adopts all 
of the groups, then the increase in members will increase the value of A and the 
expected payoff of the group. But what will happen if the challenging group can only   15
choose one of the groups? One could generalize the question asking what would be 
the optimal number of players the group would like to add given that the total 
valuation of the players is F?.  
If we increase the challenging group by L players such that the sum of the 
valuations of the players equals F, the new value of A would equal: 
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Therefore: 

























γ ,  namely the challenging 
group would prefer only one player to be added with a valuation of F. 
2.  For  5 . 0 = α   ( ) 2 = β  the challenging group is indifferent with regard to the 
different situations. 

























γ , namely the group with only 
one player will not be chosen. 
 
In case 3 it is optimal to add a group with more than one player. The question that 
now comes to mind is what would the challenging group choose if it could select both 
the size of the group (from the r groups) and the way the value of F is divided 
amongst the members? In such a case the best choice would be the largest group, r, 
with a value of 
r
F
 per member. In the example presented above where a municipality 
wishes to undertake a project purifying sewage water and it can divide the project into 
as many sub projects as it wishes (but not more than r), then if the total valuation for 
the firms is F regardless of the division, the municipality will choose the largest 
group, r, with a value of 
r
F
 per member. 
   16
4.2.2 Different valuations 
We now consider the case in which the groups may not have the same valuations. In 
the example of the shopping center discussed in the introduction, the stake in the 
contest when one firm provides all services may not be identical the sum of the stakes 
in the case where the each service is provided by a different firm.  
 
4.  For  1 5 . 0 < <α , if  1 1 > = > L L F F  (for any  1 > L ), the group with one player will be 
chosen and for  1 1 > = < L L F F  (for at least one group for  1 > L ) the group with one 
player or any group who satisfies the last condition, can be chosen depending on 
the size of F and how F is divided among the players. 
5.  For  5 . 0 = α  the group which will be chosen is the one with the highest valuation 
(the highest F). 
6.  For  5 . 0 0 < <α  then if  1 1 > = < L L F F  (for at least one group for  1 > L ) the group 
with only one player will not be chosen.  
  
To understand this, let us start by asking what is the best structure of A  with L 





















γ γ γ γ 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1
1




i L F n A.   If we maximize  L A  
with respect to  l γ  () 1 ,..., 1 ( − = L l ) we obtain that the first order conditions are given 
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8  We obtain 
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8 Since  5 . 0 0 < <α  the second order condition for maximization holds; 






















































.   17
Therefore the larger L is, the better off each player. If the challenging group can 
choose both the number of the groups and the division of F amongst the groups, the 






In this paper we have considered the case of a two interest groups competing for a 
specific public good. Each group includes a number of individuals who can invest 
effort in order to increase their chances of winning the contest. The uniqueness of this 
model is in the way we relate the investments made by the individuals in the groups. 
In one alternative explanation, the cost of investing increases with effort. This may 
well be the case with new technology under which, with a very low cost, an individual 
can participate and affect outcomes using the internet. However, if he wishes to 
increase his efforts, he must use more costly alternatives. In the second alternative, 
two individuals investing one unit have a stronger effect than one individual investing 
two units in the contest.  
  We have defined the contest over group specific public good or public 
policy and considered the equilibrium outcome. As α   increases,  the ratio of the 
investments increase and the free riding phenomenon gets stronger. Free riding is at 
its highest level when  1 = α . Thus, we have shown that free-riding will be relatively 
lower compared to what was described by Baik (2007).  Moreover, if the benefit from 
each unit invested by the individuals is sufficiently small (the cost of investment is 
high) the probability of winning is "almost" independent of the stakes of the contest 
and depends on the number of players in each group. Increasing one’s stake will 
increase the group’s efforts invested in the contest, while it may or may not affect its 
opponent’s investment. Finally, we considered the effect the structure of the group 
(and, in some sense, the optimal size of the group) has on the outcome. We find 
conditions for having a small or a large group size competing for the provision of the 
specific public good. Our results show the importance of the return to, and cost of, 
investment in the contest in determining the optimal size of the group.   18
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Appendix A 
 
Optimal investments and second order condition for a unique equilibrium  
 
Optimal investment: 
From (4) we obtain that 
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α  in equilibrium.  Taking  (A1) and (A2) to 
the power of  α  and summarizing both sides of the equation over all i and j 
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Second order conditions 
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 and the second order conditions are 































































































































































































i .   Since  i n ln  , A ln  ,
























 can be either positive, negative or zero,   22
we can get for α  close to a unit any values. However for α  sufficiently small the 
sign will be positive. The reason for this is as follows: 
 For  0 → α  it holds that  1 1 → −α
α
i n  thus  N A n
N









,  N A →
−α 1  and 
1 →
α A . Also  1 1 → −α
α
j m  thus  M B m
M









 ,  M B →
−α 1 ,  1 →
α B .  We 










i i n n n
1 1
1 ln ln α
α










j j m m m
1 1
1 ln ln α
α
. Since 
for  0 → α  it holds that  ∞ →
α
1
, thus for α  sufficiently small the expression in the 
bracket  {} •  is positive. This means that there exists α  such that for any α  that 
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